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I. INTRODUCTION 
Few real world market structures correspond well to either of the 
textbook polar cases of absolute monopoly and perfect competition. 
Formal models of two intermediate structures have been thoroughly and 
usefully analyzed under static conditions. 1 The first model assumes 
that a single firm or a stable cartel controls a sizeable fraction of 
industry capacity and faces a competitive fringe of many small suppliers, 
each too tiny to have any noticable effect on market price. Fringe 
members thus take price as beyond their control and choose output to 
maximize profit. The dominant firm or cartel maximizes its profit 
subject to the constraint imposed by fringe supply behavior. The 
second model deals with noncooperative or Cournot/Nash oligopoly. A 
finite number of sellers is assumed, each large enough to have some 
control over price. Market equilibrium is defined as a situation in 
which no individual seller can increase its profits by changing only 
its own output, given the outputs of the other sellers. 
This essay is concerned with the implications of these structures 
in markets for nonrenewable natural resources. 2 Following Hotelling 
(1931) and numerous subsequent authors, we assume that the total 
reserves of the resource in the hands of each producer cannot be 
increased and are reduced by production. Demand and cost conditions, 
including the relevant rate of interest, are constant over time. In 
such a world, producers must rationally consider price or output paths 
over time, so that both models outlined above become non-zero sum 
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differential games. In what follows, we examine solutions to the 
games implied by various assumptions. 
Our work relies heavily on that of Salant (1976), who seems to 
have done the only theoretical analysis of either imcomplete cartel 
or noncooperative oligopoly in nonreplenishable resource markets. 3 
Section 2 presents and extends his model of cartel equilibrium. 
Following Salant, it is assumed that the cartel and the competitive 
fringe have and use perfect information about prices, outputs, and 
reserves of all producers at each instant. Under this assumption, 
it is clear that all expectations must be realized. 
The assumption of perfect information seems a bit unrealistic in 
this context, however, At the very least, it is difficult for 
suppliers to verify rivals' assertions about levels of reserves. 
Accordingly, Sections 3 considers the implications of relaxing the 
assumption that the competitive fringe knows the cartel's reserves. 
The cartel can lie about reserves, thus creating expectations about 
future prices and outputs that will later prove to have been incorrect. 
(The fringe suppliers are assumed to tell the truth, perhaps because 
they are all too small to lie profitably.) However we suppose that 
the fringe can monitor cartel sales. Thus, in order for a lie about 
reserves to be believed, the cartel must follow the output path that 
would be optimal for the announced reserve level. We derive the 
surprising result that the cartel's optimal policy is to tell the truth. 
Competitive monitoring of output (plus careful analysis of observed 
output decisions) is as effective a constraint on cartel behavior as is 
full information about reserves. 
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Section 4 presents some exploratory analysis of noncooperative 
oligopoly in natural resource markets, assuming perfect information. 
We find that if all sellers have equal reserves and equal extration 
costs, existence and uniqueness of equilibrium can be established and 
some comparative dynamic results obtained. 
As it will become clear in what follows, var1ous or our results 
depend on assumptions that are stronger than we would like. Moreover, 
many potentially important aspects of natural resource markets are 
missing entirely from our models: strategic or other changes in buyer 
behavior, exploration for new reserves, differences in cartel members' 
objectives, cartel stability problems, and others. 4 Much more work 
remains to be done on imperfect competition in nonrenewable natural 
resource markets. 
2. THE BASIC CARTEL MODEL WITH FULL INFORMATION 
2.1. Assumptions 
Following Salant, (1976), a market for a nonreplenishable natural 
resource (such as oil or bauxite) is considered in which consumers 
purchase supplies at the same price from independent firms. Market 
transactions are described in terms of a Cournot-Nash, noncooperative 
game. Each supplier maximizes its own discounted profits, taking as 
given the sales path for all other firms. One group of firms which 
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can presumably exercise some market power by virtue of its large and 
concentrated resource holdings forms a cartel which acts collusively 
to set prices or limit sales. The remainder of the world's resource 
stock is dispersed among a sufficiently large number of other suppliers 
so that a dominant firm model results. Small producers act like 
competitors who perc e ive prices as given in each time period and choose 
a sales path to maximize discounted profits. The cartel simultaneously 
chooses a price path, supported by cartel sales, to maximize discounted 
profits taking aggregate sales by the competitive fringe as given. An 
equilibrium sales or price path is said to exist whenever the cartel 
and each fringe supplier are simultaneously maximizing individual 
discounted profits while taking as given the sales path of all other 
firms. 
m c Let q(t) be total market sales, and q (t) and q (t) be the sales 
by the cartel and competitive fringe respectively at time t. The 
stationary inverse demand function for the resource p(q), with p'(q) 
< 0, is characterized by whether elasticity, E(q), is decreasing, 
constant, or increasing as a function of q, as indicated below. 
(DE) E 1 (q) < 0 E(q) 1 ; p(O) < oo 
(CE) E 1 (q) 0 E(q) > 1 (yq) 
(IE) E'(q) > 0 E(q) > 1 (yq) 
Salant (1976) employs the (DE) specification which assumes a finite 
"choke price" p(O) and decreasing demand elasticity. The alternatives 
(CE) and (IE) are included here for comparision with (DE). 5 
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Specifications (DE) and (CE) are fairly standard; (IE) corresponds to 
a demand schedule with elasticity increasing in consumption. A 
justification for this assumption is that for small quantities, demand 
may be inelastic if certain amounts of the resource are essential in 
the production of some goods. At lower prices, however, the resource 
may be used in other industries for which substitute inputs exist 
as well. Consequently the elasticity of aggregate demand may increase. 
Letting, I, Im, and Ic represent initial total market, cartel, 
and competitive fringe reserves, the basic model employs a full 
information assumption, 
{ m c m c (Il) All suppliers can observe q(t), q (t), q (t), I , I }. 
Assumption (Il) is modified in section 3, to allow for partial 
observability of Im by fringe extractors. 
2.2 Charterization of Equilibria 
Market equilibrium occurs when individual suppliers are each 
maximizing discounted profits taking the sales paths of all other 
extractors as given. This Nash equilibrium concept is particularly 
compelling if one assumes the existence of a future market for the 
resource, where extractors can contract for a stream of future ship-
ments to maximize discounted profits subject to the announced shipments 
of other firms. For simplicity, zero marginal extraction costs are 
assumed. (Results presented here are basically unchanged with the 
introduction of constant positive marginal extraction costs. Details 
are omitted). Taking the sales paths of other firms as given, 
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straightforward max imization of cartel and individual fringe supplier 
profits yield the necessary conditions (2.1)-(2.4) for an equilibrium. 6 
(2.1) -rt m m c -rt m c dp m e MR (q ,q ) = e {p(q + q ) +-- q } dq 
(2.2) JT qm(t)dt Im 
0 
( 2 _3 ) e-rtp(qm + qc) 
(2.4) ! 8 qc(t)dt Ic 
0 
c Po whenever q > 0 
~m 
0 
Given the competitive sales path, the cartel maximizes profits by 
equating discounted marginal revenue (from its e xcess demand curve) 
across all time periods as in equation (2.1). Equation (2.3) is an 
equilibrium arbitrage condition which must hold whenever pr i ce-taking 
competitive fringe suppliers operate in the market. Inventory 
constraints are given by equations (2.2) and (2.4) where T and S 
represent the ex traction horizon for the cartel and competitive fringe, 
respectively . 
m The first thing to notice about this equilibrium is that q (t) > 0 
whenever q(t) > 0. This stems from the fact that ~m(O, qc) = p(q) 
m 
so that q can never go from a posi t ive to a zer o valu e or from a ze ro 
to a positive value while q(t) > 0, without violating (2 . 1) a nd (2 . 3 ). 
We n e ed two more preliminary results. Let {qm(t) } {qc(t) } denote 
the paths that maximize discounted profits for the cartel and that would 
result in competitive equilibrium respectively, in the extreme cases 
where Im = I and Ic = I. The paths for the cartel and competitive 
7 
fringe are then described by conditions (2.1) - (2.2) and (2.3) - (2.4) 
respectively (making the obvious adjustments that qc(t) = O,(yt) if Im 
=I and so forth, where necessary). If in addition to (DE), (CE), and 
(IE), we assume that MR = R' (q) > 0, R"(q) < 0 where R(q) = p(q)q, we 
can establish 
Lemma 1. Considering ~c(q) and ~m(q) as functions of q, we have 
!.C !ill 
q ' q < 0 and 
(2.5) !C < m < q (q) = q (q) as s'(q) = 0, q > 0 
> > 
. . 
(2. 6) MR < n < -- (q) =L (q ) a s s '(q) = 0 MR >p > ' 
m q = q (t) 
Lemma 2. 
m > _c > (2.7) q (0) = q (0) as s'(q) = 0 
< < 
where MR = p + ~ q. Proofs of these Lemmas follow r eadily by tak ing 
time derivatives of equations (2.1) and (2.3). 
Using Lemmas 1 and 2, the Nash equilibrium sales paths for various 
demand specifications are as follows. m Let s(t) = I (t)/I(t) represent 
current cartel inventories as a fraction of total world inventories . 
Case (DE). For s( t ) = 1 o r 0 we r ev e rt t o t he polar cases j ust 
discussed. Suppose 0 < s (O) < 1. c m Whenever q (t) = 0, MR = MR and 
(2.1) and (2.6) imply that p/p < r. Consequently, fringe suppliers never 
delay the beginning of extraction since real prices are falling. From 
(2.1) and (2.3), MRm/MRm = p/p, or MRm = Kp, 0 < K < 1, whenever qm,qc > 0. 
Solving for qc yields 
(2.8) c q = q(l-(1-K)s(q)). 
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The existance of a finite choke price implies E(q) + oo as q + 0. 
Consequently by equation (2.8) qc(and Ic(t)) go to zero while q, qm 
and Im are still positive. Thus, initially both the competitive fringe 
and the cartel operate for a period during which prices rise at the 
rate of interest. Eventually, fringe supplies are exhausted, and the 
entire market is left to the cartel, which then operates as a monopoly 
with p/p < r. 
Case (CE). WithE'= 0, it is easy to verify from (2.8), (2.2) 
c c m m 
and (2.4) that q (t) = (I (0)/I(O))q, q (t) = (I (0)/I(O))q and 
• m m • 
MR /MR = p/p = r for all t. For given initial world reserves of the 
resource, I(O), the equilibrium price and total sales path are 
independent of the distribution of resources between the cartel and 
fringe suppliers. The condition E' = 0 implies p(O) = oo, so that 
resources are allocated over infinite time at a constant real price. 
Case (IE). c • Whenever q (t) = 0, (2.1) and (2.6) imply p/p > r. 
Fringe suppliers delay extraction as much as possible, consistent with 
the eventual sale of all their inventories. Of course real (discounted) 
prices can only rise if speculators can't buy resources and store them 
for sale later on. This is probably a fair assumption in the case 
of oil. Once fringe extraction begins, equation (2.8) and the condition 
E'(q) > 0 implies qc(t) is positive for q > 0. Since E'(q) > 0 we have 
p(O) = oo so that resources are allocated over infinite time. In summary, 
if Im is sufficiently large relative to Ic there may exist an initial 
period during which (qc = 0, qm > 0) and real prices rise. 7 Eventually 
the fringe suppliers enter the industry whereupon prices rise at a 
competitive rate. 
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Summarizing, in the instance of (DE), the market is initially 
characterized by competitive price movements, followed by a second 
period of monopoly control. The opposite sequence of events can 
occur in case IE. For cases DE and IE market equilibriums become 
m 
more monopolistic in character as s = I /I+ l, whereas the equilibrium 
price and total sales path are inde p e nd ent of s fo r the CE s pecificat ion 
2.3 Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium 
This sub-section is d evo t e d t o es t ablis h i n g the fo llowing 
basic result; which generalizes the exis t e n ce proo f in Sa l a nt (197 6): 
Proposition 1: Given (DE), (CE), (IE) and (Il) a unique equilibrium 
exists characterized by (2.1) - (2.4). 
Proof: Proof for the case (DE) is presented here, noting that the 
other cases are established by a similar argument. 
~k;' I!h,, .L'nvem::ory constraint ror total reserves is written as 
S T 
(2.9) I(O,S) = J q(t)dt + J q(t)dt I 
0 s 
During the first interval, (O,S) resources are allocated competitively 
· h m c 0 d I w1 t q , q > an p p r; during the second interval the allocation 
is monopolistic with qc > 0 and p/p < r. 
Changing the variable of integration in (2.9) we obtain 
(2.10) I(q0 , q1 ) = /
0
- [q/~c]dq + /l- [q/~m]dq = I(O) 
0 
•c •m 
where q and q , calculated from equations (2.3) and (2.1) respectively, 
represent the competitive and cartel-dominated rates of change in 
sales, as a function of q, and q(O) = q
0
, q(S) = q1 and q(T) 0. 
(b) Rewriting the stock constraints for the case where all resources 
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are either sold monopolistically or competitively, we obtain 
(2.2') 
(2 .4 I) 
/'lm(O) [ -q/ ~m]dq 
0 
J c{(O) ·c [-q/q ]dq 
0 
I 
I 
Then from Lemmas 1 and 2, and equations (2.2') arid (2.4') 
(2.11) 
h _c w enever q 0 > q (0) 
and 
qo ·m ql ·m (2.12) I(q0 , q1 ) < J - [q/q ]dq + J - [-q/q ]dq ~reo) 0 
whenever q 0 ~ qm (O) 
so that in order to satisfy (2.2') (2.4') and (2.10) we must have 
(2.13') 
(c) From (2.10) we can represent q1 as a function of q0 . Note that 
Lemmas 1 and 2 and equations (2.2') and (2.4') imply 
Differentiating equation (2.10) with respect to q1 yields 
(2.15) 
Together, (2.14) and (2.15) imply that for each q 0 there is a unique 
q1 (q0) determined by equation (2.10). 
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(d ) From (c ) we can show that there is a one-to-one relationship 
c 
between I a nd q 0 for a given I(O). Equations (2.1) and (2.3) imply 
c q (q1 ) 0. From (2.8) we have 
c q = (1 - (1-K) e: (q)) q, 
c 
which together with the q (q1 ) 0 condition implies 
W I c . f e can express ln terms o q
0 
as 
(2.16) 
Note that ql U{ ( 0 )) = 0 a nd ql ( qm (0)) = q m(O) by equations (2 . 10) . . 
(2.2') and (2.4'). Then from equation (2 . 16) we obtain (assuming s e: (O,l» 
and differentiating (2.16) with respect to 
(2.18) 
q(l -Cl-K) €( q0 ) 
q(qo) 
q 0 yields 
dK dql 
----
dql dqo 
q 
€ (q) dq > 0 
Together (2.17) and (2.18) imply there e x ists a unique q 0 for each Ic 
and, conversely, for each q
0 
there is a unique Ic. 
c In summary, given initial stocks (I, I ) there exists a unique 
q 0 satisfying equation (2.16). But q 0 maps into a unique value for 
q1 to satisfy equation (2.10). Given q 0 and q1 the equilibrium is 
completely described by equation (2.1), (2.2'), (2.3), (2.4'), and 
the proof of Proposition 1 is complete. 
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2.4 Properties of Equilibrium 
m Denote p 0 and MR0 as the constant discounted price and marginal 
revenue accruing to fringe suppliers and the cartel respectively in 
m m c c m c 
market equilibrium and let W (I , I ) and W (I , I ) represent 
total discounted profits earned by the cartel and competitive fringe 
sector. Then the qualitative implications of the market equilibrium 
equations (2.1)-(2.4) for the comparative static effects of changes 
in initial inventory levels are presented in Table 1. Details of the 
sign derivations for the first five rows of Table 1 derived following 
the methods of Hartwick (1977), are presented in Appendix A for us e 
later on. 
Lines 1 and 2 of Table 1 indicate that cartel and competitive 
fringe marginal values of reserves, measured by MR~ and P
0
, respectively, 
decline with greater initial inventories. Total profits for each 
sector vary directly (inversely) with own initial reserves (reserves 
of the other sector) as revealed in lines 3 and 4. The last three 
lines of Table 1 imply that total industry profits and individual 
profits for all suppliers increasP- as S, increases, whenever 
equilibrium prices are affected by the division of initial reserves 
between the two sectors. The larger the cartel is relative to market, 
the better off are all suppliers in aggregate. 
Thus the formation of a cartel benefits all extractors including 
the fringe suppliers. Yet one can show that fringe suppliers can 
generally earn greater profits than cartel members, that individual 
members can profitably defect from the cartel, assuming others maintain 
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the cartel discipline, and that therefore cartels are basically 
unstable here, as they are in static textbook mod~ls. The 
fringe supplier is able to sell his output at some constant real 
price p 0 . Differentiating equations (2.1) and (2.3) with respect to 
time yields 
p/p < r. 
> 
p/p = r 
< c 
as € 1 0 for q 
> 
c m for q q > 0 
implying that for cases DE (IE), the cartel must sell some of its 
stock during a final (initial) extraction phase at discounted values 
below p
0
. Thus, the average present value of cartel reserves is less 
than that of reserves held by competitors. In the constant elasticity 
case, individual extractors receive the same discounted price, 
independent of the distribution of initial reserves. 
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TABLE 1 
SIGNS OF COMPARATIVE STATIC DERIVATIVES 
Endogenous 
Variables 
MRm 
0 
Po 
wm 
we 
wm + we 
wm 
Im 
Exo;;enous Variables 
Ic Im 
+ 
+ 
+ + 
a Comparative static derivatives for (DE) case 
S = Im/I 
a (O) b 
+ (0) 
+ (0) 
- (0) 
+ ( O) 
+ (0) 
+ (0) 
b The zeroes in parenthesis indicate that comparative static 
c 
derivatives are zero in those cases (CE) and sometimes (IE) 
where changes in s do not affect the price and total quantity 
paths in equilibrium. 
Comparative static derivatives for the (IE) case where changes 
in s affect price and total quantity paths in equilibrium. 
Results are derived assuming d/dq(MR(q)) < 0. 
c 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
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3. A CARTEL MODEL WITH PARTIAL OBSERVABILITY 
OF INITIAL INVENTORIES 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous section, market strategies were examined for a 
game with complete information, in which each of the suppliers knew the 
sales and initial inventories of all the others. Because there is 
significant uncertainty about the world supply of some resources like 
oil, it seems appropriate to consider situations in which there is 
partial knowledge of inital inventories. In this section, we assume 
(a) initial competitive fringe supplies are known by all extractors, 
but cartel inventories are observed only by the cartel and (b) for 
strategic purposes, the cartel can misrepresent its initial inventorie s 
to fringe suppliers so long as the cartel's sales path is "consistent" 
with its announced inventory levels. The case considered here gives 
rise to a sophisticated-naive, leader-follower model, reminiscent of 
the static Stackelberg model. The cartel chooses a best inventory and 
sales strategy taking the response of the fringe suppliers into 
account. The justification for treating the two sectors differently is 
that individual fringe suppliers perceive that they can not alter prices 
by acting strategically, where as the cartel recognizes its ability 
to affect prices by announcing different inventory and sales paths. 
The model of cartel pricing under incomplete information analyzed 
in this section is characterized by the assumption, 
(I2) c c Cartel suppliers can observe q (t), I 
m Competitive Fringe suppliers can observe q (t) and the 
and the following market procedure: 
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(Pl) At time t 0 , the cartel announces a level of initial 
stock Jill. B Assuming Ic is known, trade for current and 
future sales of the resource by both continues until the 
c m c . 
t) and q (I , I , t), s a t1sfy ing 
the conditions (2.1) to (2.4) for a market equilibrium are 
announced by the cartel and competitive fringe sectors. 
From Proposition 1 we know that these path exist and are 
unique for each pair (Im, Ic). The market remains in 
equilibrium, and fringe extractors continue to sell 
equilibrium quantities qc(Jffi, Ic, t) based on the assumption 
that Im is the true cartel inventory level, until the cartel 
deviates from its equilibrium path. At this point, the cartel 
is forced to reveal its true current inventory level, 
a nd the ma rket comes t o a n ew e quilibrium b a s e d on a ctua l 
reserve levels. 
Given (Pl), one cartel strategy is to a nnounce an initial stock 
Jill which is l a rger than the actual cartel inventory. Once a market 
-=:111 c 
equilibrium is established based on initial stocks (I , I ) resources 
will initially be consumed at a faster rate ( aq 0/ 3Im > 0) since stocks 
are believed to be large. If as a result, fringe suppliers are induced 
to sell most of their stocks in early time periods, the cartel can 
assume a monopoly position later on when fringe supplies have been depleted. 
Note that the cartel is allowed to change sales without compensating 
consumers who might be harmed in the process. This would b e pos s ible 
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if futures contracts for sales were perfectly binding. Of course in 
order to be convincing, the cartel must sell certain quantities 
qm(rm, Ic, t) at artifically deflated prices in return for the monopoly 
position it hopes to attain in the future. Obviously, this is just 
one of several strategies that the cartel might pursue. 
3.2 Cheating by Misrepresenting Initial Inventories 
This procedure (Pl) describes the simplest option for reporting 
initial inventories. Clearly, the strategy in which the cartel 
reports its actual initial inventory and then follows the market 
equilibrium path thereafter is feasible under (Pl) and the following 
proposition asserts that this is, in fact, the optimal policy for the 
cartel to choose, even for more complicated strategies as well. For 
simplicity in the remainder of the paper we shall confine our attention 
to the decreasing elasticity case. To make some of the mathematics 
more tractable we consider a special case of (DE) 
(DE') a+l p(q) = a - q ; -1 < a < oo, a > 0 
The (DE') demand specification is reasonably general as it allows for 
convex and concave demand schedules. 
Proposition 2: Given the partial information structure (I2) and the 
demand specification (DE') the best strategy for the cartel is to 
announce its actual initial inventories and follow the equilibrium 
sales path. 
Proposition 2 is quite general. It rules out the optimality of 
any strategy which involves a single or repeated misrepresentation of 
existing cartel reserves. 
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Proof 
First we demonstrate that any cheating strategy the cartel pursues 
that satisfies procedure (Pl) is dominated by telling the truth. 
All cheating strategies must involve a period of time in which a 
strategy of the type described by (Pl) is used, and we are therefore 
able to rule out the optimality of all possible cheating schemes. 
(a) At some time t 0 the cartel announces its current inventories as 
being Im(t0). We arbitrarily set t 0 = 0. Assume Im is the actual 
initial cartel stock. Construct 
(3.1) =1Il. c V(I , I , T) T -rt m c m f e [p1 (q1 , q1 , t) q ]dt 0 
+ e-rT Wm(Im- JT q~(rm, Ic, t)dt, Ic-!Tq~(l m,Ic,t)dt 
0 0 
- m c 
sales and pl is the equilibrium price, all as functions of I , I and t. 
m c 
where q1 and q are the unique equilibrium cartel and competitive fringe 1 
The function V( • • ) , is the discounted profit to the cartel which 
announces initial inventories rm, follows the Nash equilibrium 
corresponding to crm, Ic) from time 0 to T, then announces its actual 
· h" h are Im- !T m( ) d inventories at tlme T, w lc q1 t dt, an receives the 0 
payoff, W(·, •), which is the sum of discounted profits earned by the 
cartel for a Nash equilibrium corresponding to existing inventories 
(b) Differe ntiating V(Im, Ic,T) with respect toT, we obtain 
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-=m c ( 3 . 2 ) 0V(I ~ I ~T) 
(h 
m 
aw c()}-rT 
- q T e 
arc 1 
av - m m We wish to show- < 0 for I (0) +I (0). dT 
(3.3) 
-m For I (0) I m(O) we have the identity 
m c V(I , I , T) 
so that 
(3 .4) 
m c (3V(I , I , T) 
dT 0, (\rT) 
awm(T) 
In appendix A we show that ~~~ m lfl(T) m MR (T) and ---'-'-----'-'-.L.. = MR ( T) - p ( T) 
aim(T) 2 Ic(T) 2 2 
m 
where P?.(T) and MR2 (T) are the constant discounted price and cartel 
marginal revenue for the new Nash equilibrium corresponding to initial 
Substituting for these terms in equation (3.4) yields 
m c m (3.5) rW(I (T), I (T)) = (P 2 (T) - MR2 (T)(q 2 (T)) 
Substituting for rW(Im(T), Ic(T) in ( 3. 2) yields 
(3. 6) 
m c 
From equation (3.6) we can verify that ~VJI ' I ,T) 
dT 
-rt 
e 
0 by noting that 
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P1 (T) = P2 (T) and q1 (T) = q 2 (T) (equilibrium price and quantity paths 
do not change) when I m (O) = Im(O). 
(c) We now wish to show 
(3. 7) av (I m' I c' T) - m m ClT < 0 for I T I 
Suppose the demand schedule is Jinear with a = 0 and dp/dq = -1. 
The second exp ression on the right hand side of (3.6) can be 
rewritten as 
(3.8) 
which when combined with (3.6) yields 
(3. 9) ; a = 0 
Similarly, one can establish the following inequalities in the case 
(DE') when a =f= 0: 
(3.10) ~~ < (Pl(T)- P2 (T)) (q~ (T)- q~ (T)), a E(O, 00 ) 
(3 .11) l..Y. < ()T 
In Appendix B we establish 
(3.12) - m > m as I = I (0) 
< 
(q~(T) - q~(T)~ 
q2(P2(T)),----m-------
q2(T) 
as (-1,0) 
which togethe r wi th the condition 
establish 
(3.13) 3V - m m aT < 0 whenever I r I 
21 
m c 3q(I ,I ,0) 
> 0 is sufficient to 
(c) Thus, telling the truth dominates any strategy involving an 
initial period of cheating by stock misrepresentation. This result 
generalizes to more complicated strategies. Suppose the cartel 
announces different inventories at N various times, assuming fringe 
suppliers naively continue to adjust sales in accord with these 
inventories. From equation (3.13), working backwards, the best policy 
for the c artel is to reveal its true inventory in the last period N 
as well as period N-1. But the same reasoning which led to equation 
(3.13) inplies that t he c artel should reveal its true stock level in 
period N-2, given that actual inventories are to be announced for the 
periods N-1 and N. Repeating the argument for periods N-3, N-4 ... and 
so on, we can show that telling the truth dominates any cheating 
strategy, and Proposition 2 is established . 
When cartel s ales can be monitored , cheating d oesn ' t work becau se 
the cartel must invest too much to convince fringe suppliers that its 
announced inventories are valid. For example, announcing very large 
inventories I m in the hopes of increasing initial sales and inducing 
fringe supplie rs to sell out early, requires that the cartel sell 
substantial quantities at artificially deflated prices. The loss 
incurred by the sale of these quantities outweights the gains from a 
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future monopoly position for the cartel. Stated in another way the 
response of fringe sales to different inventory levels is too sluggish 
for cheating to work. For example, Salant (1976, pg. 1085) shows that 
if demand is linear, then q1c(t) is independent of the cartel's actual 
or announced reserve holdings. Thus, the cartel is unable to change 
fringe production at all by misrepresenting initial reserves. In general, 
continuous monitoring of output makes lies about reserves unprofitable 
and thus not worth worrying about. In Lewis and Schmalensee (1978) 
we assume that initial reserves are known, but that cartel output is 
unobservable. There, we find it is profitable for the cartel to lie 
either by over-stating or under-stating its sales for a finite early 
period. 
4. NONCOOPERATIVE OLIGOPOLY 
4.1 Assumptions and Notation 
In this sec tion, we briefly consider some properties of noncooperative 
oligopoly models of renewable resource markets. Aside form some 
analysis by Salant (1976, Appendix B), this appears to be the first 
reasonably systematic examination of such models. 
Assume there exist N "firms" (which may be ordinary firms, nations, 
partial cartels, o r other reserve owners) capable of p r o duc ing the 
resource. Let total initial reserves be I, let firm i's initial 
reserves be I., and letS.= I./I, for all i. Similarly, let q.(t) 
l l l l 
be firm i's rate of production at time t, let Q(t) be the sum of 
the q.(t) and let cr.(t) = q.(t)/Q(t). We assume that firm i's unit 
l l l 
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extraction cost is c., a constant. As before, P(t) 
1 
the market price and r is the rate of discount. 
P[Q(t)] is 
Each firm is assumed to choose the time path of its output so as 
to maximize the present value of its net revenue, taking as given the 
outputs of the other firms. In equilibrium, no single firm can 
p r ofi t ably alter i t s out pu t s tra t egy . It i s cle a r tha t for f irms , 
the discounted net marginal revenue at all t such that q.(t) > 0 must be 
1 
equal, and this common value must at least equal the discounted net 
price at all other times. If not, since the outputs of all other firms 
are taken as given, a shift in production policy would raise the 
present value of net revenue. If we let a[P(t)] = -dP /dQ, the e quilibrium 
(4.la) P(t) q. (t) a[P(t)] A.e rt if q. (t) > 0, c. 
' 1 1 1 1 
(4.lb) p (t) < A. rt ifq.(t) 0, and c. e 
1- 1 1 
()() 
(4.2) I . 
1 
f q. ( t) 
0 1 
dt, 
fo r i l, ... ,N, a l on g with the d emand constra int P (t) =P [ Q(t)]. 
It is clear that A. measures the marginal (private) value to firm i 
1 
of additional reserves at time zero. 
4.2 Zero Ex tra ction Cost 
In order to focus on the implications of various elements of 
the general situation defined above, it will be useful to begin by 
assumimg that all the c. are zero. Extension to the case of equal 
1 
positive C. is not difficult. The simplest situation is then the case 
1 
of constant elasticity of demand, case CE. If E is the absolute value 
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of demand elasticity, conditions (4.la) may be written as 
rt P[l- o./£] = A.e . 
1 1 
(4.3) 
At some timet, let A be the simple average of the A. of those firms 
1 
producing at a positive rate. Differentiation of (4.3), summation 
across i, and division then yields 
(4.4) P/P = r = r(A/A.) ll- o./£]/[1- 1/N£]. 
1 1 
From this it is immediate that o. must be constant for alliin equilibrium, 
1 
so that o. = S. for all i and t. It is clear from (4.3) that for such 
1 1 
an equilibrium to exist, £must exceed the largest of the S .. All firms 
1 
then produce forever, and price rises at the rate of interest. In 
this case, as was noted in Section 2 above, the function P(t) is 
independent of market structure. 
In fact, explicit solution is easily obtained in this special 
case. If we choose units so that the demand curve can be written as 
-£ Q = P , we obtain 
(4.5a) P(t) = ( I)-1/£ rt r £ e , 
(4.5b) A. (r£I)-l/£[1 - S./£], 
1 1 
(4.5c) v. -1/£ I.(r£I) , 
1 1 
where V. is the present value of firm i's receipts. It is easy to show 
1 
that A = av./ai., holding constant the reserve levels of other firms. i 1 1 
Note that smaller firms (as measured by reserves) have larger A. and 
1 
thus greater incentives for exploration. Thus, even though the price 
path overtime in this model is independent of the distribution of reserves 
among producers, it seems likely that lower concentration would lead 
to more exploration in an expanded model. 
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Now let us consider case DE, in which demand elasticity falls 
with total output. The analysis is simplified by a ssuming 
S. 1/N for all i. Let P(O) = F, the choke price, be finite as before. 
l 
By the symmetry of the problem, we can look for an equilibrium in 
which cr. = 1/N for all i and t. If Tis the total time taken to 
l 
exhaust the resource, the equilibrium conditions can be written as 
(4.6) 
(4.7) 
Fe-ru = P -(1/N)Q(P)a(P) = mr(P), 
T 
! Q[P(t)] dt =I. 
0 
0 < u < T 
The assumption that demand elasticity rises with P can be seen to imply 
(4.8) a'Q < ( E+l)/ E 
To establish the existence of a noncooperative equilibrium, we 
follow Salant's (1976) method of proof. Assume there exists a price, 
P, at which NE = 1. For prices below P, mr is negative, so that P > P 
at all times. Differentiation of (4.6) then establishes 
(4 . 9) NE - 1 P = rP --~~~--~~~ E[N+l) - a'Q] 
From (4.8), Pis increasing for P > P, so that Q is falling at all times. 
Further, (4 . 8) and (4.9) establish that (P/P) < r at all times and that 
in the limit as N increases, (P/P) approaches r. 
Suppose one picks a P0 and allows P to grow according to (4.9) 
until it equals F. As long as demand is smooth, the total production 
along this path, I, will be a continuous function of P0 . Clearly I(F) 
0. As P0 approaches P from above, I must increase without bound, along 
with the total time the system spends with price arbitrarily near P. 
It is easily seen that I is monotone decreasing in P . Thus there must 
0 
exist a P0 such that I(P 0 ) = I, and we have established the first part of 
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Proposition 3 If c. = 0 and S. = 1/N, fori= l, ... ,N, if demand 
1 1 
is sufficiently smooth, and if there exists P such that NE(P) = 1 
then there exists a unique noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium 
satisfying (4.6) - (4.7) in case DE. Price increases at less than 
the rate of interest. Increases in N(a) lower T, (b) raise P 0 , 
(c) lower total profits, (d) raise the marginal value of reserves 
to each firm, A, and (e) raise the discounted value of net welfare. 
Let us first prove (a) and (b). We want to show that if N'> N, 
then T' < T and P0 < P 0 , where primes are used to denote quantities 
associated with N', and unprimed quantities are associated with N. 
That is, increasing the number of firms with reserves held fixed 
leads to more rapid extraction. For P > P, mr is easily seen to be 
increasing in P under DE. For fixed positive u (time until exhaustion), 
(4.6) then implies that P' < P, so that Q' > Q. Given the total output 
constraint, (4.7), this implies that T' must be less than T. Since 
P is a monotone function of time, (4.7) can be transformed via a change 
of variab le to 
F 
(4. 7') J [Q(P)/P(P)] dP I. 
Po 
Suppose P'o = P
0
. From (4.8) and (4.9), P'(P) > P(P) for P E[P 0 ,F), and 
Q(P) = Q'(P). Thus less total output is produced with N' than with N. 
The only way to satisfy the constraint is to have P0 < P 0 , and (a) and 
(b) of Proposition 3 are established. 
Part (d) of Proposition 3 follows immediately from (a) and (4.la). 
With more competition, the incremental value of reserves rises for each 
firm. Heuristically, there are two opposed forces here: price tends 
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to be lower, but marginal revenue tends to be closer to price. The 
second of these dominates. Explora tion incentives are enhanced with 
other firms, even though prices are lower. 
We can most readily establish (c) and (e) of Proposition 3, by 
writing the equilibrium output path as Q(N,t) for fixed I. We suppose 
that demand is smooth enough that Q is differentiable inN. Then (4.6) 
can be re-written as 
(4.6') P[Q(N,t)] - (1/N)Q(N,t) a{P[Q(N,t))} = Aert. 
Differentiation with respect to N for fixed t and substitution for 
aQ/N2 yield 
(4.10) 
By (4.8) and P > P, the quantity multiplying QN is positive. From (b) 
of Proposition 3, QN(N,O) > 0, so that the right-hand side of (4.10) 
is initially positive. But since P grows at a rate less than r, (4.10) 
then implies that QN is initially positive, reaches zero in finite 
time, and is negative thereafter. 
Total discounted profit for all firms can be written as 
(4.11) 
Since Q(N,T) 
(4.15) av/aN 
using (4.6'). 
T 
V = f P[Q(N,t)]Q(N,t)e-rt dt. 
0 
0 for any N, and P(O) F is finite, we have 
T T T 
-rt -rt ! [P-aQ]QN(N,t)e dt = N ! AQN(N ,t)dt-(N-1) !(Pe )QN(N,t)dt. 
0 0 0 
The first integral is zero from (4.7) and Q(N,T) = 0. 
-rt Since P is always increasing at a rate less than r, (Pe ) is every-
where decreasing. Since QN is positive for small t and negative for 
large t, integrating to zero overall, it follows that the second integral 
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on the right of (4.15) is positive. Thus av/ aN is negative, as was to 
be shown. This is an intuitive r e sult; more competition lowers profits. 
Finally, the s um of total discounted consumers' surplus and firm's 
r e nts is give n by 
T{Q(N,t ) 
(4.16) w = J P(x) dx} e-rt dt. 
Since Q(N,T) 
(4.17) 
0 0 
0, differentiation yields 
p 
-rt 
aw; aN = J (Pe )QN(N,t) dt, 
0 
which is positive on the reasoning above. We have thus completed the 
proof of Proposition 3 and shown that under our assumption, increased 
competition improves performance. The a sycrmetric c a se where initial 
r e serve s and unit extrac tio n costs are not equal is c onsiderably more 
complicated and is being investigated in a subsequent paper by the 
9 
authors. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. See, for instance, Scherer (1970, ch. 5). It is fair to say 
that these are the only widely used formal models of intermediate 
struc tures except for those concerned with entry, cartel stability, 
or differentiated products. 
2. Interesting analyses of oligopoly pricing of renewable resources 
appears in Clark (1978) and Levhari and Mirman (1978). Stiglitz 
(1976) has analyzed the relation between competitive and monopoly 
behavior in nonrenewable resource markets. 
3. In two interesting and important recent papers, Pindyck (1977, 1978) 
computes the wealth-maximizing price policies for a number of 
actual incomplete cartels, taking into account distributed lags 
in demand. In order to obtain tractable models, however, Pindyck 
assumes that competitors of these cartels behave myopically. In 
both Salant's (1976) analysis and the models that follow, all 
producers are fully rational, but demand curves are stationary. 
4. For work on these and related aspects of resource markets, see 
Eckbo (1976), Hnyilicza and Pindyck (1976), Kosobud and Stokes 
(1977), Pakravan (1976), Pindyck (1977, 1978), and Schmalensee 
(1976). 
5. For specifications (CE) and (IE) choke prices are infinite so 
that we need to assume lim p(q)q < oo • 
q~o 
6. These are equivalent to equations (1)- (4) in Salant (1976). 
Henceforth, time arguments are deleted where no confusion exists. 
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7. Clearly for the extreme case where Im =I, the entire stock is 
allocated in a monopoly market and p/p > r. If we change the 
distribution of initial reserves by decreasing Im and increasing 
Ic we eventually encounter a situation in which all reserves are 
allocated under competitive conditions with p/p = r. Recall from 
Lemma 2 that qc(O) is the initial sales rate which occurs when all 
resources are sold competitively with p/p = r. c m When (q , q > 0) 
we have qm = (1-K)s(q)q by equation (2.8). Thus the largest 
value of Im consistant with the competitive sale of all reserves is 
where 
00 
I m J (1-K)s(q)qdq 
0 
q(O) = q c(O) 
K = 1 - 1 
------
E(qc(O)) 
For Im > ~ m, an initial period exists in which qc m 0, q > 0. 
8. Actually, it is sufficient for the cartel to just announce a 
quantity path, since its total initial reserves can be inferred 
from the sales path. 
9. In the case c. = 0, i = 1,2,,,N, and S. < S. for some pair of firms 
1 1 J 
we find that if a noncooperative equilibrium exists then (a) prices 
rise at less than the rate of interest, (b) firm i exhausts reserves 
and ceases production as q1 falls to zero before firm j and (c) the 
initial price P0 is higher the more unequal the initial distribution 
of reserves. If in addition, 0 < c. ~c. for some i and j, then 
1 J 
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the total discounted cost of producing the equilibrium total 
output path, Q(t) is not minimized. 
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APPENDIX A 
Comparative static derivations for the first five rows of Table 1 
are signed following a method developed by Hartwick (1977) for the 
(DE) demand specification, noting that the other cases (CE) and (IE) 
are handled in a similar manner. Details of the other derivations in 
Table 1 are available upon request from the authors. 
Let us first consider the first two lines in Table 1. 
From equations (2.8), (2.10), and (2.16) we have 
(A.l) ·c (1- (1- K(q1 ) E(q)]q/q dq 
(A. 2) 
Total differentiation of equations (Al) and (A2) yields a set of 
equations which can be represented in matrix form as 
(A. 3) 
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where > 0 
< 0 
> 0 
> 0 
< 0 
Repeated application of Cramer's Rule yields, 
(A.4) c dq0 /di > 0 
(A. S) dq 0 /dim > 0 
(A. 6) dq1 /diC > 0 
m (A. 7) dql/dl > 0 
(A.8) dq0 /ds dq 0 /dim dq0 /drc < 0 
dq1 /ds 
m c (A.9) dq/di dql/di > 0 
Where a comparison of relative magnitudes in equations in (A4) and (AS), 
and (A6) and (A7) are required to sign dq0 /dS and dq1 /dS. Equations 
(A4), (AS), (A8) and the condition p'< 0 imply the signs appearing 
in the second row of Table l . From equations (2.1) and (2.3) we have 
that whenever qc(t), qm(t) > 0 
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(A.lO) MRm = k p 0 0 
Differentiating (AlO) first with respect to Im and then Ic yields 
(A.ll) 
(A.l2) 
(A.l3) < 0 
where a comparison of relative magnitudes in (All) and (Al2) is 
required to sign (Al3). 
A similar approach is used for lines 3-5 in Table 1. The functions 
wm = 
T2-rt e m m (A.l4) J0e p(q +q )q dt 
(A.l5) 
we 
T1-rt c m c 
!0 e p(q +q )q dt 
where T1 and T2 are the time hori zon s over which fringe suppliers and 
the cartel operate respectively, with T2 > T1 . 
Straightforward differentiation of ~with respect to Im yields: 
(A.l6) 3Wm/3Im = JT!-rt[p dqm/dlm + dp/dq (dqm/dlm+dqc/dlm)qm]dt 
0 
The second term on the righthand side of (Al6) is zero since 
Rearranging (Al6) we obtain 
0. 
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In order to preserve our inventory constraints we have from equation (2.2) 
arc Tl a c mm (A.l8) 0 r _E_9._ dt + aT1/ai q (T1) arm 0 arm 
(A.l9) arm;arm 1 - f 
T2 lL dt 
0 arm 
Note that qm(T1 ) = 0 in order to satisfy equations (2.1) and (2.3). 
Using equations (2.11), (2.3), (Al8) and (Al9) we obtain 
(A. 20) 
T T 
aWm/aim = MR~ f 2dqm/dlmdt+(MR~- p0) f 1dqc/ a imdt=MR~ > 0 0 
Straightforward but somewhat tedious application of this same method can 
be shown to yield the following derivatives with the indicated signs 
(A. 21) awm/ arc m MRO - Po < 0 
(A. 22) awm;as awm;arm - awm;arc 0 > 0 p 
T 
(A. 23 awe I arm f le-rt[dp/dq c dq/dlm]dt < 0 • q . 
0 
Tl 
awe ;arc -rt[dp/dq c c (A.24) Po + f e . q dg/di ]dt > 0 
0 
(A.25) awc;as = awc;arm - awe/ale< 0 
(A. 26) a(wm + wc)/as = awm/as + 3Wc/ as > 0 
The condition 
(B .1) 
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APPENDIX B 
- m < m 
as I = I (0) 
> 
for (DE) specification is derived as follows. 
(a) -m c m -m c Let p(t,I , I ) and MR (t;I , I ) be the Nash equilibrium price 
and marginal revenue paths. From Table 1, <lP(O) 
aim 
< 0 implying an 
initial downward shift in prices as I m increases. In addition, 
m -rt MR0 (0) = e F. where F is equal to the choke price and T is the time 
it takes to exhaust total inventories. Since 3MRm(O) -rt F '3T -re -
ar m ar m 
We conclude that ~ > 0 which combined with our earlier argument 
arm 
can be shown to imply that ap(t) 
ai m 
q(t) for t > t 1 we have 
(B. 2) 
< 0, (Vt) or aq(t) > o. 
ar m 
> 0 
< 0 
(b) aqm(t) We now wish to sign ~~~-3I m for t ~ t 1 which we will do examining 
the sign of 
aqc(t) Since aq ( t) > 0 we have 
ai m ai m 
a{(t) ('sc(t)) ('s<tl) a c (B. 3) sign sign sign~ 
arm 3q(t) arm <lq(t) 
Given (DE) and (2 . 1) and (2.3) we have 
(B.4) m q (t) 
m ~- MR (t) 
(a+l) q(t)a 
e-rt(p(O) - MRm(O)) 
a (a+l) q (t) 
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Straightforward differentiation of qc(t) with respect to q(t), substi-
tuting for qm(t) from (B.4) yields 
d m -rt ~-a m ~ a l-e-rt dq(O)(p(O)-MR (O))e (q(O)a qctf(p(o)-MR (0))] (B.5) (a+l) q(t) 
From (B.5) we can establish that 
(B.6) d m 
dq(O) (P(O)-MR (0)) > 0 
d m 
To see this suppose dq(O)(p(O)-MR (0)) <0. Then if a> 0, (B .5 ) implies 
<lqc(t) ~~~ > 0 (yt) which violates (2.3). 
ai m Differentiating (B.5) with 
respect to time we obtain 
(B. 7) ~t ~ ~~~~~) ) = 
r l dqe -lj -e-rt / -re-:rtd d(O) (f'-(&-MtF-II\"a)(-q(l1}-a+a(a-=F_f)~q -{_at2) -1;CP(O)-HYD1(0) fl 
dq(t) , a+ 1 
d c(t) 
If a < 0 and d~(t) ~ 0 for some 
aqc(t) 
for all t > t '. Clearly -
aq(t) 
dqc(t) 
t' then (B.7) implies dq(t) < 0 
t' E(O, t 1 ) (otherwise < 0 for some 
aqc(tl) 
(2.3) is violated) but this implies 3q(tl) < 0 which is not an 
allowable variation since qc(t1 ) = 0. Consequently (B.6) must hold. 
Given (B.6) we 
m 
c 
can now establish the signs of aq (t) and 
Clq (t) 
() q (t) For a 
aq(t) m 
a{(t) 
< 0 it follows from (B.5) that oq(t) < 1 which 
. 1. 1.9. 1mp 1es oq(t) aqc(t) > d for all t. For a> 0 we also have that oq(t) <1 
c m 
for te[O,t
1
], for if oq (t) > 1 at some t' <t
1
, (B.7) implies oq (t) < 0 
3q(t) 3q(t) 
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for all t' < t ~ t 1 . But given (B.2) qm(t) is discontinuous at t 1 
implying that MRm(t
1
-) > MRm(t
1
) which violates (2.3). Thus we have 
established 
(B. 8) > 0, (\i't) 
Condition (B.l) now follows immediately from (B.8) and fact that aq(t) > 0. 
ar m 
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